The Rational Animal

I recently discussed and debated with Stefan Molyneux about his ethical theory, which he calls Universally Preferable Behaviour. His theory is presented in a book of the same name, and I highly encourage anyone reading this post to read the book and form their own opinion rather than take my word for it that UPB (as it is commonly abbreviated) is flawed.

This is going to be done in multiple parts in order to ensure that UPB is thoroughly addressed. This is, of course, Part I.

UPB hits its first major flaws very early in its presentation. Stefan Molyneux presents a series of ground rules before going into UPB. Take a look at ground rule #1:

“I fully accept the Humean distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought.’ Valid moral rules cannot be directly derived from the existence of anything in reality. The fact that human beings in general prefer to live, and must successfully interact with reality in order to do so, cannot be the basis for any valid theory of ethics. Some people clearly do not prefer to live, and steadfastly reject reality, so this definition of ethics remains subjective and conditional.”

Molyneux’s proof that “the fact that human beings in general prefer to live, and must successfully interact with reality in order to do so, cannot be the basis for any valid theory of ethics” is that “some people clearly do not prefer to live, and steadfastly reject reality, so this definition of ethics remains subjective and conditional.”

In other words, his argument is that the fact that some people choose not to live leads to ethical subjectivism if one uses the requirements of life as a basis for ethics. This completely ignores the fact that ethics are principles (e.g. abstractions) used for making decisions, and that only living entities have the ability or need to make decisions. Dead things need no ethical principles; only living things do.

It’s especially interesting that Molyneux essentially provides the Randian solution to the Is-Ought dichotomy in his argument that the Is-Ought dichotomy is valid. His refutation of it seems very weak next to the Randian argument itself.

Now let’s examine ground rule #2:

“Ethics cannot be objectively defined as ‘that which is good for man’s survival.’ Certain individuals can survive very well by preying on others, so this definition of ethics does not overcome the problem of subjectivism. In biological terms, this would be analogous to describing evolutionary tendencies as ‘that which is good for life’s survival’ – this would make no sense. Human society is an ecosystem of competing interests, just as the rainforest is, and what is ‘good’ for one man so often comes at the expense of another.”

Here Molyneux seems to be guilty of the ethical intrinsicism / subjectivism dichotomy, which I describe in detail in this video. It seems like he is trying to divorce someone’s interests and values from ethics, which of course begs the question “What good is ethics if it doesn’t do anything for my interests or values?”

Another problem here is that, even though Molyneux is trying to criticize the egoist position, he misrepresents it. A more valid formulation of the egoist position would be “that which is good for my survival and happiness.” It appears he was paraphrasing Rand, but any reader of Rand would understand that, in the context of that quotation, Rand was using the word “man” to refer to “an individual man”, not to mankind as Molyneux seems to interpret it here.

Molyneux then proceeds to attack this misrepresentation by forming an analogy. He states that the egoist position is “analogous to describing evolutionary tendencies as ‘that which is good for life’s survival.’” The obvious error here is likening an ethical theory to a scientific theory, a problem which will arise many times throughout UPB. The study of evolution has nothing to do with “good” or “bad” and this analogy comes across as a bit confusing as a result.

In ground rule #3, Molyneux rejects the theory that ethics exist in some higher plane of existence (such as Plato’s forms). I have no disagreement with him on this, so let’s move on to rule #4:

“I do not believe that morality can be defined or determined with reference to ‘arguments from effect,’ or the predicted consequences of ethical propositions. Utilitarianism, or ‘the greatest good for the greatest number,’ does not solve the problem of subjectivism, since the odds of any central planner knowing what is objectively good for everyone else are about the same as any central economic planner knowing how to efficiently allocate resources in the absence of price – effectively zero. Also, that which is considered ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’ changes according to culture, knowledge, time and circumstances, which also fails to overcome the problem of subjectivism. We do not judge the value of scientific experiments according to some Platonic higher realm, or some utilitarian optimisation – they are judged in accordance with the scientific method. I will take the same approach in this book.”

While Molyneux’s criticism of utilitarianism is solid, his criticism of “arguments from effect” is not. I’ll demonstrate with an example; which is better, a surgeon stabbing you in the chest at random, or a surgeon stabbing you in the chest to remove a malignant tumor?

Clearly the action of stabbing is being judged by any rational person by the consequences of that action. In the first example, only harm is incurred, resulting in a net loss for the person being stabbed. In the second example, the benefits of the surgery greatly exceed the harm incurred, resulting in a net gain for the person being stabbed.

Consequences are the only rational way to judge an action. Imagine if someone asserted that a given action was good even though it only caused harm and had no benefits at all. This would seem absurd and the action itself would seem pointless. Now how those consequences should be judged is another topic entirely; my point right now is simply that there is no other way to judge an action.

Notice how Molyneux has been using the word subjectivism. It appears that he has a concrete, intrinsic view of ethical principles in which the result of those principles must be the same for everyone. People are, of course, different, and the same action taken by two different people might have different ethical qualities based on the context, such as in the example of the two surgeons above.

The key thing to note is that even though the action is the same in both cases, the ethical principles behind those actions were different. In the same way, two people applying the same ethical principle can lead to them taking different actions. This is why Bob might become a baker and Joe might become a computer programmer despite sharing ethical principles.

If this is confusing, try to think of ethical principles as equations. If I have a mathematical function, my input is going to determine my output. If I insert the number 2, the function might output the number 7. If I insert the number 3, it might output the number 31. And so on.

Imagine if someone claimed that a given mathematical function was “subjective” (e.g. arbitrary) if it didn’t always output the same number. This is essentially what Molyneux is doing throughout the book when he refers to subjectivism.

I have no major disagreements with the rest of the ground rules that Molyneux presents, so I figure this is a good time to end Part I. Part II has been completed and is available now.