More On Virtue Ethics
So the more I think about the idea of virtue ethics, the more the idea makes sense to me.
For those unfamiliar with the idea, I recommend the Wikipedia article on the matter, which defines virtue ethics as “a branch of moral philosophy that emphasizes character, rather than rules or consequences, as the key element of ethical thinking.”
Let’s take honesty for example. A typical egoist will usually defend honesty in terms of external consequences. People tend to like you better if you’re honest, are more willing to interact and do business with you, etc. The consequences of honesty in most cases are good in the long term, and this is why honesty should be pursued.
The same could be said for intellectual honesty or internal honesty. Being honest with yourself tends to have better consequences, so it is in your rational self-interest to pursue honesty within yourself as well.
This approach has always bugged me for some reason, and I think I’m finally starting to understand why. Honesty, at its most fundamental level, essentially refers to adherence to reality as best you know it. Internally, being honest with yourself means actually regarding the facts based on the actual information you have. Externally, being honest with others means providing truthful information as best you can, without making attempts to deceive or mislead.
At its core, honesty is a form of rationality (as I am beginning to suspect all valid virtues are) and involves consistent adherence to rationality. I think that, apart from the external consequences of being honest, there is an immediate psychological well-being that is derived from being honest. By allowing our rational faculty to express itself fully, we are more at peace with ourselves and reality and tend to be happier, even if the external consequences of honesty are occasionally negative.
Virtue ethics seems to provide a valid basis for appreciating certain virtues, such as honesty, for their own sake without regard for external consequences, while still being consistent with the idea of rational self-interest.
