I’ve gotten into a couple of discussions with people who disliked the idea that happiness is the ultimate goal in life. I’m writing this to give a brief explanation of what I mean when I say happiness, because in most cases the contention seems to ultimately fall on what happiness is.

For example, someone suggested to me that, if all I seek is happiness, why don’t I just take a pill to elevate the seratonin levels in my brain? I asked him why he doesn’t take said pill if that is all he believes happiness is. His response was that there were things that needed to be pursued, like truth, in order to be satisfied.

I found this confusing, because if taking this “happy pill” did not satisfy him, then he’s not happy in any real sense of the term. A brief discussion revealed that he equated happiness with pleasure (though he denied it).

Of course if one defines happiness as pleasure, then it’s easy to think of things worth pursuing at the expense of it. As he pointed out, taking a happy pill would leave some part of you unsatisfied. But this is not what I mean when I say happiness.

Happiness is a sense of satisfaction with one’s own existence that results from the successful achievement of one’s values. it is the advanced form of the pleasure-pain mechanism as only experienced by rational animals.

Happiness signifies a successful state of life. As Aristotle noted, it is the only thing people seem to pursue for its own sake rather than for the sake of something else. Aristotle’s entire system of ethics is a discussion on how to achieve happiness.

Virtues like rationality, honesty, truth seeking, justice, courage, etc. are all means to the end of happiness. A happy life does not consist of laying around all day taking pills to elevate seratonin, and I think any casual observation of a drug addict would reveal this fact. The fact that such an existence repulses you is evidence that you don’t expect to achieve real happiness from it.

Of course now, being an anarchist, I find myself more sympathetic to the libertarian movement and interacting with those involved with it on a fairly regular basis. However, the criticism that many libertarians view liberty as axiomatic is still valid.

Libertarianism, like any assertion beyond the most fundamental metaphysical claims, is not an idea that is true simply in and of itself. It is up to libertarians to demonstrate the validity of libertarianism through logical argument, which means that libertarians need a philosophy underlying their ideas about liberty to demonstrate that liberty is the valid approach to human interaction.

While I really enjoy the works of Murray Rothbard, he is particularly guilty of divorcing libertarianism from the underlying philosophical disciplines of ethics, epistemology, and metaphysics. In The Ethics of Liberty, he provides a somewhat convincing, though very short and undetailed, argument in favor of individual self-ownership.

His argument is essentially this; there are three possible ways to deal with the ownership of people. Self-ownership (e.g. individualism), collective ownership (e.g. collectivism), and class ownership (e.g. aristocracy). He starts with the premise that there must be a universal moral code to determine which of these viewpoints is correct.

Aristocracy is eliminated pretty much immediately, since one class of people owning another is inherently non-universal. Collective ownership would require that some group of people handle distributing resources, since it is impossible for everyone to own exactly an equal share of everyone else without some governing body to organize it. This essentially creates class ownership again and this is eliminated.

This leaves self-ownership as the only universalizable approach to the ownership of people. It is from here that Rothbard proceeds to justify property rights, the non-aggression principle, and the libertarian outlook.

The problem with this approach is that it leaves a lot of unanswered questions. For example, it never adequately demonstrates that there even is a universal moral code that should govern the ownership of people. It never explains what ownership consists of. It never explains why one should follow this univeral moral code.

I am not saying that I believe there is no universal morality or that I agree with the is-ought dichotomy. I am simply saying that Rothbard did not adequately address these questions with his approach to libertarianism.

More recently, Stefan Molyneux of Freedomainradio.com has self-published a book on his ethical system, which he calls universally preferable behavior. It’s a relatively short read, and his argument is basically a more fleshed out version of Rothbard’s argument.

The central idea behind universally preferable behavior is that, for an ethical premise or theory to be true, it must be possible to practice it consistently. For example, “rape is good” can’t be true because then people being raped would be bad to resist rape (since rape is good), and if they don’t resist then rape is no longer occurring (which is also bad since this is also stopping rape), which means that the ethical theory “rape is good” is literally impossible to actually practice universally and consistently.

While it is true that an ethical theory that is impossible in practice can’t possible be valid, Molyneux fails to provide a solid justification for the premise that universal ethics even exist. He provides several arguments for it in the book, but if you read his arguments and think about it, you’ll find that these arguments only succeed in demonstrating that, perhaps between two individuals, a mutual (not necessarily universal) ethic exists.

Another interesting thing about Molyneux’s ethical theory is that he actually accepts the is-ought dichotomy. While he will say that he can demonstrate, logically, that “rape is bad” is a universalizable ethical theory, he will not say that one ought to not rape people. To me, this kind of removes the whole point of having an ethical theory. What about his ethical theory is true, if its not making any claims on how people should act? What aspect of reality is he even describing?

Now that we’ve briefly discussed Rothbard’s and Molyneux’s ideas behind the justification of libertarianism, I want you to note that there is a word that is conspicuously absent in both cases. That word is happiness.

At no point do either Rothbard or Molyneux assert, at least with their ethical theories, that libertarianism will make you happier. Or that you ought to pursue a libertarian society because it best promotes your values. Or that your life will be better if we can achieve a libertarian society.

This separation of libertarianism from values and happiness, I think, is the rotten core holding libertarianism back. This idea that somehow liberty and freedom are good for their own sakes or for scientific reasons, completely independent of whether they help you live a happier life.

Indeed, imagine if I walked up to you and said I could logically demonstrate that it is moral to punch yourself in the face right now. I’m certain that no matter how logical my argument might sound, you would scarcely be convinced. The reason for that is that punching yourself in the face is painful, and detracts from your happiness.

While Ayn Rand made her mistakes, her defense of libertarian ideas as a necessary precondition to achieving happiness is absolutely vital to the success of libertarianism, and harkens back to the days of classical liberalism. It seems many libertarians have forgotten that the words “the pursuit of happiness” were not placed in the Declaration of Independence just because they sound nice.

There is a small movement of libertarians who also see this problem and who, like Rand, derive their inspiration from the works of Aristotle and other various Ancient Greek philosophers. In particular, Roderick T. Long has been doing great work along these lines, and I encourage everyone to listen to his material on mises.org.

Another potentially important work is being written by Geoffrey Allan Plauche for his Ph.D. dissertation. Entitled Aristotelian Liberalism: An Inquiry into the Foundations of a Free and Flourishing Society, it appears that Plauche is following in Rand’s footsteps by attempting to provide a complete philosophy to support libertarian ideas that is largely inspired by Aristotle. You can read some incomplete portions of it on his website.

It is important that we have a valid justification for libertarianism that is rooted in the desire to live a happy life. Few people are going to be convinced to do something if it is antithetical to their own happiness, and frankly it would be irrational to request that they do. Fans of Rothbard and Molyneux, I highly encourage you to read some of the material written by Ayn Rand, as well as the gentlemen I mention above.

For those unfamiliar with the idea, I recommend the Wikipedia article on the matter, which defines virtue ethics as “a branch of moral philosophy that emphasizes character, rather than rules or consequences, as the key element of ethical thinking.”

Let’s take honesty for example. A typical egoist will usually defend honesty in terms of external consequences. People tend to like you better if you’re honest, are more willing to interact and do business with you, etc. The consequences of honesty in most cases are good in the long term, and this is why honesty should be pursued.

The same could be said for intellectual honesty or internal honesty. Being honest with yourself tends to have better consequences, so it is in your rational self-interest to pursue honesty within yourself as well.

This approach has always bugged me for some reason, and I think I’m finally starting to understand why. Honesty, at its most fundamental level, essentially refers to adherence to reality as best you know it. Internally, being honest with yourself means actually regarding the facts based on the actual information you have. Externally, being honest with others means providing truthful information as best you can, without making attempts to deceive or mislead.

At its core, honesty is a form of rationality (as I am beginning to suspect all valid virtues are) and involves consistent adherence to rationality. I think that, apart from the external consequences of being honest, there is an immediate psychological well-being that is derived from being honest. By allowing our rational faculty to express itself fully, we are more at peace with ourselves and reality and tend to be happier, even if the external consequences of honesty are occasionally negative.

Virtue ethics seems to provide a valid basis for appreciating certain virtues, such as honesty, for their own sake without regard for external consequences, while still being consistent with the idea of rational self-interest.

The market is an abstraction and does not refer to something that is deliberately implemented. It describes the naturally occurring exchanges that occur between people in the absence of coercion. These exchanges, which are never done for the sake of creating a free market, occur because people mutually benefit from interaction and trade.

The market is similar to evolution in this regard. No animal ever acts for the sake of evolving. Rather, animals act for their own survival and reproduction naturally, and this results in an abstract process we call evolution. Both the market and evolution are examples of what is sometimes called spontaneous order, where an orderly system forms despite no intelligent being deliberately constructing the system.

Those of us (well, most of us) who argue for a free market are not arguing for a system to be implemented onto people by force. To the contrary, we see a naturally forming system that works better than any system that can be implemented by force, and we seek to remove coercion from human relationships so that this system can work automatically and at optimal efficiency.

The fact that socialists don’t see the market this way seems very similar to how some Christians don’t see evolution this way. They both see an orderly system and conclude that this system is implemented rather than naturally occurring. The socialist concludes from this that free market anarchists are out to impose a free market system on people, whether they want it or not.

But if the market just describes the natural interactions of people when coercion is not involved, what is a “free market system?” Any non-coercive social arrangement, even voluntary communes and syndicalist factories, would be a part of a “free market system.”

The point is, apart from a few abstract principles about non-aggression, the free market isn’t a system anymore than evolution is. The whole point of advocating a free market is that no particular way of life is imposed on anyone. When you look at it this way, it’s hard to imagine anything being legitimately called anarchism that isn’t a form of free market anarchism.

Problematic Premise #1: Voting Matters

The first problem with this classic line of argumentation is that it operates under the assumption that our current democracy works, in the sense that you really do have a choice and are proportionately represented in the government.

Let’s take a presidential election for example. You can vote for any number of third party candidates that have no real chance of getting elected, and not be represented at all, or you can vote for whichever of the two major party candidates you dislike the least, and barely be represented. There’s no option to be proportionately represented, and your vote is going to have basically no effect on how the government is run.

Problematic Premise #2: Rights Exist By Permission

The second problem with this argument is the idea that rights exist by permission. If I have an actual right, that exists due to natural facts about being a rational animal and not by permission of the people around me, then clearly I have a right to complain if that right is violated.

Certainly a random group of people can’t announce an election and declare that I will lose my rights if everyone votes against them. They might do so and then violate my rights, but the rights would still be there.

Analogy Time

Imagine that you’re standing in front of a casino. You see a man walk into the casino with $1000 and a smile on his face. An hour later, the man leaves with no money and a frown. Would you say that he is right to complain about losing his money?

Of course not. He knew what he was doing when he bet his money in a casino and was aware of the potential consequences. By spending his money in the casino, he sanctioned the actions of the casino and the consequences of his participation.

Now imagine that the man leaves, and another man walks in front of the casino but doesn’t go in. He starts to walk away when he is assaulted by a mugger, who takes all of his money and runs away. Would you say that he is right to complain about losing his money?

Of course. He was not aware of the mugger’s existence or motives, and had never sanctioned or agreed to the interaction with the mugger. He did not voluntarily participate at all; the mugging was forced on him. Clearly this man has every right to complain about being mugged.

Now apply this to voting. If I don’t vote, then I never sanctioned or agreed to interaction with the state. When the state violates my rights, I am in the right to complain since I never agreed to the state’s existence or its actions. It was completely forced on me, just like being mugged.

But if I do vote, fully aware of how our system works, then I am implicitly acknowledging the legitimacy of the system and its results. In this case, I am more like the gambler who loses all of his money. I knew what I was getting into and participated anyway, and would not be right to complain about it.

So the way I see it, it’s those who vote, who participate in the state apparatus, that have no right to complain. The rest of us are just innocent victims.

For example, he brings up how there are two types of means; instrumental and constitutive. Instrumental means are prior to the goal; for example, if I want to play Beethoven’s 9th on the piano, buying a piano, getting sheet music, etc. would all be instrumental means.

Constitutive means are means that are a part of the goal itself. Using the previous example, the act of playing the correct notes in the right order and rhythm would be a constitutive means. While it is logically coherent to say “I wish I could play Beethoven’s 9th without having to pay for a piano,” it would make no sense to say “I wish I could play Beethoven’s 9th without having to play these notes in this specific order.” Playing those notes in that order is Beethoven’s 9th.

Another thing that Long discusses at length is the concept of eudaimonia, a Greek word that roughly translates to long-term happiness, human flourishing, etc. Many of the ancient Greeks would cite eudaimonia as the ultimate end of human action, which would make them egoists (though not necessarily egoists in some modern understandings of the term).

So I’ve been thinking a lot about these concepts lately, and the question that keeps popping in my head is this; Are there certain values or goals apart from the end of eudamonia that are constitutive means to achieving eudaimonia? Are there certain ends that, while not truly ends in themselves, almost qualify as such since they are a part of the end of eudaimonia and should be pursued consistently as a result?

For example, human beings are rational animals. Through a process of sensory perception and logical thought, we can develop a basic understanding of the world around us on a level that most, if not all, other animals cannot. This is because we are able to form concepts, which allow human beings to make more efficient use of the limited memory and processing power of the human mind (Read Introduction to Objectivist Epistemology for a more detailed analysis of this).

Not only can we do this, but we have to in order to survive. As humans, our rational faculty is the equivalent of an eagle’s claws or a chameleon’s camouflage; without it, we would not last long. We are not instinctively guided to survival except in the most basic ways. If you doubt this, go into a forest and eat anything that “tastes good” and see how long it takes for a poisonous plant or mushroom to kill you.

I think from this, we can conclude that rationality is a constitutive means to achieving eudaimonia. It is not just a means to the end of human happiness and flourishing, but part of it. This would mean that it is logically incoherent to say that sometimes it is in a man’s best interest to be irrational; this would be like saying you rue the fact that you have to play specific notes in a specific order to play Beethoven’s 9th.

Using rationality as a core virtue and constitutive means to eudaimonia, I think we can discover other virtues that should be pursued as though they were ends in themselves. This is not to say that they should be pursued at the expense of one’s own self-interest, but that pursuing them is a constitutive means towards that end.

I could keep going but I’ll stop here for now. I will say, as a brief summary, that certain virtues like justice and honesty are fundamentally connected to rationality and, as a result, it could be argued that they are constitutive means to achieving eudaimonia. Leave comments to let me know your thoughts.

This is a response to an Objectivist giving what are pretty standard Randian criticisms of anarcho-capitalism. I’ll provide some quotations from the video and where I take issue with them.

“The political goal of both anarcho-capitalists and Objectivists is to ban the initiation of force in human relationships.”

While on paper this is true, in practice I can’t honestly say that Objectivists have behaved in this way. Look at the Ayn Rand Institute’s pro-Iraq War stance, despite the fact that the war is demonstrably political and not about preventing the American public from being coerced. This is a glaring inconsistency, but not necessarily related to the debate between minimal statism and anarcho-capitalism.

“A monopoly on retaliatory force is required because the non-initiation of force is not optional or debatable; it is the very principle which both systems claim to be aiming to uphold.”

This doesn’t follow logically until someone can demonstrate that a monopoly on retaliatory force is the only way, or at least the best way, to minimize the initiation of force. Otherwise it’s just an empty assertion.

“Allowing competition is effectively saying that the non-aggression principle is optional, as it allows private agencies to decide what laws and principles they want to follow, regardless of whether they are correct.”

I could just say that allowing the state to exist is effectively saying that the non-aggression principle is optional, as it allows those that run the state to decide what laws and principles they want to follow, regardless of whether they are correct.

“Multiple competing agencies will necessarily conflict, since if they were in complete agreement there would be, in principle, no need for there to be multiple agencies to begin with.”

Allowing a variety of agencies to enter the market provides a natural check on agencies that wish to initiate force on people. Unlike a state, no one agency has authority over the others and can act criminally without consequences. And generally, people do not like to be coerced.

There are also other aspects to what a private arbitration or police agency might offer that have nothing to do with the laws that it enforces, such as price, quality, customer service, etc. Even if every agency followed the non-aggression principle to the letter, there are other areas in which they can compete.

“The non-aggression principle is not optional, and should not be treated as such by leaving it up to private individuals to decide whether they want to enforce it, or their own non-objective values and beliefs.”

Like earlier, I could just say that the non-aggression principle is not optional, and should not be treated as such by leaving it up to those in the state to decide whether they want to enforce it, or their own non-objective values and beliefs.

“Coercion cannot be stopped by allowing those who use it to make up their own mind as to whether they want to continue using it or not…”

I could walk outside and bludgeon someone to death right now, and we have a state. As morbid as this sounds, it’s a fact. People can do whatever they want, although they can’t escape the consequences of their actions.

I agree that in all but the most unusual of circumstances, the non-aggression principle is not morally optional e.g. I cannot walk outside and bludgeon someone to death right now and be a good person at the same time. But being a good person is optional. If it weren’t an option, there wouldn’t be bad people and we wouldn’t even be discussing this.

Think of it this way. Imagine if there were a device that could enter people’s minds and make it so they would never consider doing anything morally wrong. Would you consider the existence of such a device an amazingly good thing or a horrifyingly bad thing?

My point is that the goal isn’t to somehow remove the option of choosing immorality or aggression. The goal is to arrange agreements with other people in whatever way maximizes our self-interest, and the non-aggression principle (e.g. responding to force with force but not initiating it) provides a solid means for doing this.

Letting people make up their own minds isn’t optional without a mind control device of some kind, and even then I think using such a thing on anyone who has yet to do anything wrong would be itself an aggressive act.

“One principle needs only one agency to uphold it.”

Who are you to decide for other people what they need in order to achieve their values? I might not draw this conclusion; indeed, I’ve concluded that a stateless society of competing agencies is far more likely to be non-aggressive than a society with a state whose actions are checked by nobody.

Now to a right-libertarian minarchist, which I used to be a little over a year ago, this comes across as pointless and immoral regulation of the free market. After all, if I am selling access to a given network, don’t I have the right to dictate the terms on which I allow access? Isn’t this a violation of my property right in my own network that links the end user to the internet?

To a “liberal” statist, Net Neutrality is a defense of free speech and a blow at corporate hegemony. The people have a right to access the whole internet, they say, and the corporations have no right to deny this when they sell internet access.

This is all complicated by the fact that the creation of the Internet was not a private matter but directly the result of state funding and research. Couldn’t it be argued that, if our tax dollars helped pay for the internet, that we have a right to access all of it without bias? After all, internet service providers are essentially profiting from providing access to a valuable resource that the American public funded.

So the question we arrive at is, from a consistent left-libertarian perspective, is Net Neutrality good or bad?

Most of the arguments regarding Net Neutrality fall on the false premise that what we have is essentially a free market, and that the debate is over whether or not regulation is necessary over this part of the market.

But we do not have a free market. The entire system is arranged such that large corporations and the state are in bed with one another. Large corporations like Verizon and Comcast get an unfair market advantage due to a number of interventionist economic regulations, such as limited liability, etc. I won’t go into the details here but I highly recommend Kevin Carson’s book Studies in Mutualist Political Economy for a more detailed analysis.

So what does this mean for Net Neutrality? If such regulation is put into place, the state wins; it has its foot in the door to begin regulating and censoring the internet. If such regulation is not put into place, the large corporations win, they have their foot in the door to begin regulating and censoring the internet.

In either case, none of us win. The myth behind Net Neutrality is that it means that we, the people, will control access to the internet. In reality, it’ll simply determine which side of our statist/corporatist ruling class gets to regulate and censor the internet.

As far as personal preference goes, I’d prefer that Net Neutrality regulation is not implemented for the simple reason that right now I can access the whole internet with little to no bias in what I access. Passing new regulation could change that by placing new power into the hands of the state to regulate the internet.

Ultimately though, it’s not going to impact anyone outside of the ruling class much either way. It’s only a matter of time before the internet starts to see regulation and censorship, and it really doesn’t matter which part of the ruling class is doing it. We lose either way.

What kind of Anarchist are you? created with QuizFarm.com

You scored as Anarcho-Capitalist Anarcho-capitalism is perhaps more closely linked the libertarian tradition than anarchism as it favours a free market and a stateless society. Private businesses would replace the functions of the state. This form of anarchism is largely an American phenomenon and first emerged in the 1950s (although it arguably has its roots in 19th century individualist anarchism and classical liberalism). Key thinkers include Murray Rothbard. Anarcho-Capitalist 100% Anarcho-Syndicalist 80% Anarcha-Feminist 40% Anarcho-Primitivist 40% Christian Anarchist 20% Anarcho-Communist 20%

I think the most interesting thing about the result is that anarcho-syndicalism was at 80%. Even though it still labelled me as an anarcho-capitalist, clearly I answered most of the syndicalism-related questions the same way an anarcho-syndicalist would.

I wonder if that’s a typical result for anyone in the left-Rothbardian camp of anarchism.

We have a completely voluntary military, and only adults can join. Adults that have the same rational faculty and access to information that you and I do. If I am capable of understanding that the military is a murderous group of thugs that support a violent minarchy-gone-wrong, then they are too.

This of course means that the troops, just like everyone else, are ethically responsible for their decisions and actions. If someone joins the military and commit acts of theft, murder, rape, etc. then they are not a good person, even if they think that they are. Would a random murderer be a good person just because he actually believed his murders were morally good?

I think the “I don’t support the war, but I do support our troops,” viewpoint ultimately stems from a desire to still believe that the United States of America is good, righteous and just. Pretending that the U.S. government is simply making a judgment error when warring with Iraq makes it easier to rationalize this viewpoint.

If we accept that not supporting the war logically means not supporting those who make war possible (the troops), this leads us down the road of questioning the moral nature of the state itself. After all, if the state is responsible for evil, doesn’t that make the state evil? It’s easier to not think about this or its implications and to instead come up with “I don’t support the war, but I do support our troops.”