The Rational Animal

Continued from Part I

The next part of Molyneux’s book is mostly epistemological, covering what he calls the “null zone.” The closest thing to a straight definition of the “null zone” that we are provided is this:

Thus we have the little truth (don’t punch) and the great truth (violence is wrong) but in the middle, we have this “null zone” where the complete opposite of both our little truths and our great truths is considered perfectly true.

He gives several examples, such as the middle truth of “The Earth is fixed and immovable” resting in between the little truth of “A rock falls if I drop it,” and the great truth of “All things are affected by gravity.” That great truth is a paraphrasing that I interpreted from the writing; it wasn’t stated explicitly.

My main criticism of this concept is that it is, in my opinion, a layman’s variation on the anti-conceptual mentality that Ayn Rand and others wrote about decades ago. At this point I highly recommend reading my post on the subject to ensure that what follows will make sense to you.

The little truths that Molyneux references appear to be low-level abstractions that directly refer to concretes. The examples he gives of little truths are “that rock falls,” “smoke rises,” “fire is hot,” etc. All of these directly refer to concrete objects in the real world and require very little abstracting to understand.

The great truths that Molyneux references appear to be high-level abstractions that rest on a hierarchy of previously formed low-level and high-level abstractions. The best example of a great truth he gives is “violence is wrong,” on which he focuses heavily. There are other examples but no others are explicitly stated in the form of “X is a great truth.”

So now our task is to discover what a middle truth is. To use the example about violence, Molyneux lists the little truth as “don’t punch,” and the great truth as “violence is wrong.” In the “null zone” of middle truths he mentions things such as the Christian God, who advocates the use of violence in some situations, and the fact that we, as a culture, tend to greatly respect men in the military, whose job is to commit acts of violence.

God, of course, is a floating abstraction, and is not tied to anything that actually exists. But can the same claim be made about how our culture greatly respects men in the military? I think it can.

Why do people respect men in the military? I think that most people see soldiers as servants, dedicating their lives to the protection of the American people. In other words, they see soldiers as agents of altruistic defense.

Consider the concept of “the American people.” Is it, functionally, any different than the concept of “society,” or “the collective?” Like, all forms of collectivism, “the American people,” at least in this train of thought, is also a floating abstraction.

So the premise that underlies the statement “I respect men who are in the military” (at least when most people make that statement) is that “dedicating yourself to the interests of the collective is good.”

But what is the collective? What if your actions are good for 99% of American citizens and bad for 1%? Did you still serve the interests of the collective? This is why collectivism as a whole is a form of floating abstraction; it is an attempt to treat a group of people as if it were a single, concrete entity that doesn’t actually exist in reality.

Let’s bring this all back together. Fundamentally, most people respect soldiers because they think they are altruists dedicated to serving “the American people,” which is a form of collectivism and thus a floating abstraction.

So it appears, at least from Molyneux’s treatment, that a consistent element of middle truths is that they rest on floating abstractions as their foundation. Unlike the little truth of “don’t punch,” which rests on the concrete act of punching, and the great truth of “violence is wrong,” which rests on abstractions about what violence is, the middle truth of “men in the military deserve respect,” rests on the premise “serving the good of the collective is virtuous.” The collective, of course, being a floating abstraction.

Now at this point, someone might wonder why I am even going against Molyneux here. After all, it appears I’ve clarified his position regarding the “null zone” more than disproved or attacked it. And I think some of his argumentation is defensible on the grounds that he was trying to communicate to the layman by avoiding technical terminology or advanced philosophical argumentation.

The main reason I bring it up is that, during my debate with Molyneux, I mentioned the anti-conceptual mentality and cited it as the reason why libertarian ideas have yet to fully grip the population. In a later podcast, he apparently regarded my description of the concept of God or patriotism as floating abstractions that try to emulate low-level abstractions as me reformulating my argumentation after he allegedly disproved it. In reality, I think we agreed on more than he thought.

Thus concludes Part II. Expect Part III in the very near future.

According to this article on CNN.com, in the United States more than 1 in every 100 adults (1 in every 99.1 adults to be specific) is in jail or prison. Per capita, this puts the United States ahead of every other nation on the planet.

This passage is particularly enlightening:

“We need to be smarter,” said David Muhlhausen, a criminal justice expert with the conservative Heritage Foundation. “We’re not incarcerating all the people who commit serious crimes — but we’re also probably incarcerating people who don’t need to be.”

But we need to jail those nasty criminals, right? I mean, clearly we’re all safer from having these people behind bars, right?

“For all the money spent on corrections today, there hasn’t been a clear and convincing return for public safety,” said the project’s director, Adam Gelb.

And here I thought the state was efficient and looking out for our safety. Well, ok, I guess I didn’t think that, and it is nice to see empirical data supporting my opinion.

I’m curious how many prisoners are there because of drug possession and prostitution laws.

The question of free will vs. determinism was one that haunted me for quite a while. It wasn’t until recently that I properly understood and integrated the solution to the problem, and I hope to communicate this effectively in this post to anyone else who might be undecided or confused on the matter.

There are three basic premises that I think are all true, with most people on either side of the fence of the free will vs. determinism debate denying at least one of these premises. Before discussing their compatibility, I will address and explain why each premise is logically true without regard for the greater argument of free will vs. determinism.

Premise 1: Contradictions Do Not Exist.
This premise is, in essence, a formulation of the law of identity. A is A. Things are what they are. This fact is observable in everyday life on a regular basis; a toaster does not behave simultaneously as a toaster and a car, for example.

Indeed, if we were to honestly accept the premise that contradictions actually exist in reality (rather than as errors in our own thinking), any kind of rational thought would break down entirely, and the question of “free will vs. determinism”, along with all other claims about reality, would become irrelevant.

Premise 2: Causality Is True And Consistent
Causality is, in essence, the law of identity extrapolated over time. Things are what they are, and their behavior is determined by their nature. An apple rots because of its nature as an apple. A ball falls because of the natures of the ball and the Earth, as well as gravity.

It isn’t apparent that any exceptions exist. Indeed, if something could somehow evade causality, its behavior would be completely haphazard and random; a characteristic that I don’t think could truly be ascribed to anything. Even the most apparently random things have been explained in rational, causal terms through scientific inquiry, and the gaps in our knowledge continue to close.

Premise 3: People Make Decisions
Any casual observation of people, as well as oneself, would demonstrate the validity of this premise. Maybe today you decided to shower, or maybe you didn’t. Maybe you decided to drive to the store, or maybe you didn’t. But you decided, that much is clear. It’s not like you drove to the store and bought groceries, all the while incredulous at the fact that you’re doing it. You made the decision to do it.

Compatibilism: A Synthesis of True Premises
Most people who support the “free will” viewpoint deny premise 2, despite the constant overwhelming empirical data supporting it. They assert that decisions occur without any prior causal force, and are thus “free” from the constraints of causality. They ignore that this would make the human mind profoundly and bizarrely unique among existents as it would be the only thing not bound by causality despite the fact that the human brain is made of matter like everything else.

Most people who support the “determinism” viewpoint deny premise 3, despite the constant overwhelming empirical data supporting it. They assert that causality means that decisions don’t actually occur, and that we are in effect (if not in practice!) robots following a computer program. They ignore the direct experience of their own minds and their own ability to make decisions.

But as I stated above, all of these premises seem to be not only true, but strongly supported by evidence. They would all be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to refute. This means that the actual answer to the question of free will vs. determinism must actually incorporate all three of these premises without contradiction. This is what is meant by the term “compatibilism.”

What Is A Decision?
I think that the fatal flaw in the argument on both sides of this debate is a false definition of what a decision is. This is what I think most people define a decision as:

Decision - A conscious choice to take a certain action, free from any prior cause.

This of course is what leads the free will advocates to abandon causality (at least partially) and the determinism advocates to abandon the idea that decisions exist.

But as we see above, premise 2 demonstrates that causality does exist and is consistent, and premise 3 demonstrates that people make decisions. This means that the commonly accepted definition of what a decision is must be wrong, since it does not allow for the possibility of premises 2 and 3 both being true. I propose the following definition:

Decision - A conscious choice to take a certain action which is causally determined by the state of the deciding agent e.g. his knowledge, memories, emotions, values, thoughts, perceptions, and physical condition.

Let’s break this down a bit. “Conscious” of course implies that the deciding agent must be intelligent. Only conscious entities make decisions; if an apple falls from a tree, we wouldn’t claim that either the apple, the tree, the Earth, or gravity itself decided to make the apple fall.

“Choice” implies the presence of alternatives. This does not mean that the result of the decision isn’t causal; it only means that, outside of the deciding agent, there are multiple possibilities of what will happen next, and that it is the causal behavior within the deciding agent that will determine which of these alternatives will happen.

Let’s say a guy named Jim walked into a store, perused for a bit, and bought a cookie. There were many alternatives available to Jim; he could’ve bought some beef jerky, some milk, left the store without buying anything, etc. Nothing about the nature of the store itself was causally determining which of these outcomes will occur. While Jim was, of course, bound to the laws of physics and his alternatives were limited by the nature of the store, multiple alternatives still existed.

This means that, assuming that causality is true and consistent, it was the causal relationships within Jim himself that determined the outcome. This is what we mean when we say that Jim chose what he did; it was the causal relationships within Jim that led to his decision.

Internal Causality
It must be understood, in order to understand the compatibilist position, that the human mind is not a singular entity. A wide variety of mental existents interact with one another and produce causal results, just like the actual physical interactions that generate them. If you’ve ever felt internally conflicted (and I’d think most of us have), then the reality of this should be apparent.

When Jim was trying to decide what to buy, a large number of causal relationships were resolving themselves until it led to Jim buying the cookie. Jim was hungry, but Jim also has a finite amount of money. Jim has knowledge of alternatives available to him (going to another store, going hungry, buying something other than a cookie), has values (maybe Jim really likes cookies, but maybe Jim also values losing weight and is on a diet), has emotions (maybe Jim is in good spirits because he just got a new job, so he’s more willing to part with money now), and so on.

And if you asked Jim, assuming he was the friendly sort, he’d probably be happy to enlighten you on some of these factors. Like most of us, Jim is directly and consciously aware of these processes, even if he doesn’t have a sophisticated philosophical understanding of them. If you asserted that Jim made his decision with no prior causes, he’d be confused at what you mean, and rightly so.

This is of course a continual process. Jim’s decision to buy a cookie leads to new knowledge and may affect his values, ideas, state of mind, etc. From birth until death, these causal relationships are what drive Jim’s decision making.

Volition Requires Causality
Once you understand how the decision making process actually works, a startling conclusion arises; not only are decisions not free from causality, but decisions actually require causality. It is the presence of causal relationships within yourself that actually allows you to make decisions.

Imagine if your decisions were not actually causal. This would mean that the decisions were not determined by any prior cause. That means that the various things that do actually causally affect your decisions, such as your values, thoughts, emotions, knowledge, etc., now do not.

How would your decisions be made then? Would they just be random, without any regard for what you want? If this is what is meant by free will, I don’t imagine any of us would want it!

Conclusion
Maybe this was a bit long for a blog entry. Kudos to you for getting this far! I’d like to think that I have, at least on a basic level, demonstrated the validity of the compatibilist position and how it is unique to the free will vs. determinism debate. Of course, I invite commentary and alternative opinions, so don’t hesitate to let me know what you think!

Roderick T. Long recently posted this article on LewRockwell.com that basically details Alan Greenspan’s transition from Objectivism to chairman of the Federal Reserve (a very anti-libertarian and anti-Objectivist organization if there ever was one).

I found it very interesting since many people in libertarian and Objectivist circles have wondered if Greenspan was working as an “inside man” trying to change things for the better or if he truly abandoned his Randian principles.

The short answer seems to be the latter.

As an aside, I highly recommend that everyone check out Roderick T. Long’s work as well as his blog. He’s a fantastic thinker who brings a lot of Aristotelian and Randian insights to libertarianism and market anarchism, even if he is in desperate need of a good web designer.

There is a mindset that seems to be very dominant in all cultures, and I think it is the root of why libertarian ideas have yet to fully take hold of most large populations. There is a common aversion to the formation of higher level abstractions that some have dubbed “the anti-conceptual mentality.”

Terminology
Concrete - An actually existing object in reality. A concrete is not a mental unit but rather something that actually exists, such as a chair or a tree.

Concept - To quote Ayn Rand, “A concept is a mental integration of two or more units possessing the same distinguishing characteristic(s), with their particular measurements omitted.” The purpose of concepts is to provide a way for the mind to organize information about concretes.

Low-Level Abstraction - A concept that directly refers to a set of concrete objects. A low-level abstraction is a mental unit and does not exist independent of the mind. While a chair would be a concrete object, the concept of chair, present in a human mind, is a low-level abstraction.

High-Level Abstraction - A concept formed by the integration of several lower level concepts that still ultimately ties to reality through low-level abstractions. An example would be the concept of integrity; there are no concrete objects one can point to and rationally say “That is an integrity,” but integrity is a valid concept nonetheless.

Floating Abstraction - An invalid abstraction that does not tie to reality through low-level abstractions. A classic example of a floating abstraction would be the idea of God.

The Formation of a Low-Level Abstraction
Various objects in reality -> Shared traits of those objects (Four legs, makes “moo” sound, chews cud, etc.) -> Process of mental integration -> The concept of cow.

A low-level abstraction is very easy to form, and requires very little effort compared to the formation of high-level abstractions. Even very young children with a very weak grasp of the English language can form the concept of cow.

The Formation of a High-Level Abstraction
Various low-level abstractions (such as human being) -> The concepts of truth and reality -> Relationship of truth and reality to a human being’s thoughts and actions -> The concept of Integrity.

Notice how the concept of integrity has both low-level abstractions (human being) and high-level abstractions (truth, reality) underneath it. Concepts form in a hierarchy, with high-level abstractions being above low-level ones. Not all high-level abstractions are equal though; some, like integrity, rest above other high-level abstractions.

Unlike a low-level abstraction, a high-level abstraction often requires deliberate mental effort to form. While it may only take one act of integration to form a low-level abstraction, several layers of integration and abstraction are required to form a concept like integrity. This is why a small child who might grasp the concept of cow probably won’t fully grasp the concept of integrity; the child still has to form the various concepts that underlie the concept of integrity.

The Formation of a Floating Abstraction
Already established emotions and values -> The concept of God -> A nebulous, unperceivable entity called God.

Much like a low-level abstraction, a floating abstraction does not require much effort to form. In the case of God, whatever feelings and values someone already has are formed into the abstraction of “God”, and then an attempt is made to tie this abstraction to a concrete object.

The word floating is used because the abstraction is not actually formed from low-level abstractions or the observation of concrete objects. As such, it is not actually tied to reality, but floating and unconnected to anything else. A person must then attempt to tie the floating abstraction to reality after forming the abstraction, thus creating the imaginary concrete object God. Note that a properly formed concept does not have to be tied to reality after being formed, since the formation of it started with reality and moved up from there.

The Anti-Conceptual Mentality
Human beings cannot escape their nature, and human beings by nature are conceptual beings. Concepts are the way our minds organize sensory data in order to understand the world around us. As these concepts are formed in layers over top of one another, a concept hierarchy is created with more and more abstract concepts (more abstract meaning higher level) being formed.

As such, it is not actually possible to avoid thinking conceptually, but many people will try to focus primarily on low-level abstractions and floating abstractions in a vain attempt to do so. This is the anti-conceptual mentality.

One important thing to note is that anti-conceptual people will still use words that refer to high-level concepts (such as integrity, democracy, etc.), but have not actually properly formed the concepts that they embody. Usually they just attach a very simple meaning to these words based on the connotations people tend to associate with them. For example, integrity might be a “good trait that means someone is good”, democracy might be a “good trait that means a society is good”, etc.

Libertarian ideas tend to be very abstract (e.g. very high level). If someone is deliberately evading the act of high-level integration, it’s going to be very difficult to convince them that organizing society around the non-aggression principle is in their best interests (or even that they ought to seek out their best interests). You might as well try to convince a brick wall that the non-aggression principle is good.

That being said, I’m not sure what the fix for this is. Arguably, states implant a simplified, anti-conceptual mindset into children via public education. I think anti-conceptualism needs to be consistently called out and named, and then attacked. Most anti-conceptual people aren’t even aware that there is such a thing as an anti-conceptual mentality.

I recently discussed and debated with Stefan Molyneux about his ethical theory, which he calls Universally Preferable Behaviour. His theory is presented in a book of the same name, and I highly encourage anyone reading this post to read the book and form their own opinion rather than take my word for it that UPB (as it is commonly abbreviated) is flawed.

This is going to be done in multiple parts in order to ensure that UPB is thoroughly addressed. This is, of course, Part I.

UPB hits its first major flaws very early in its presentation. Stefan Molyneux presents a series of ground rules before going into UPB. Take a look at ground rule #1:

“I fully accept the Humean distinction between ‘is’ and ‘ought.’ Valid moral rules cannot be directly derived from the existence of anything in reality. The fact that human beings in general prefer to live, and must successfully interact with reality in order to do so, cannot be the basis for any valid theory of ethics. Some people clearly do not prefer to live, and steadfastly reject reality, so this definition of ethics remains subjective and conditional.”

Molyneux’s proof that “the fact that human beings in general prefer to live, and must successfully interact with reality in order to do so, cannot be the basis for any valid theory of ethics” is that “some people clearly do not prefer to live, and steadfastly reject reality, so this definition of ethics remains subjective and conditional.”

In other words, his argument is that the fact that some people choose not to live leads to ethical subjectivism if one uses the requirements of life as a basis for ethics. This completely ignores the fact that ethics are principles (e.g. abstractions) used for making decisions, and that only living entities have the ability or need to make decisions. Dead things need no ethical principles; only living things do.

It’s especially interesting that Molyneux essentially provides the Randian solution to the Is-Ought dichotomy in his argument that the Is-Ought dichotomy is valid. His refutation of it seems very weak next to the Randian argument itself.

Now let’s examine ground rule #2:

“Ethics cannot be objectively defined as ‘that which is good for man’s survival.’ Certain individuals can survive very well by preying on others, so this definition of ethics does not overcome the problem of subjectivism. In biological terms, this would be analogous to describing evolutionary tendencies as ‘that which is good for life’s survival’ – this would make no sense. Human society is an ecosystem of competing interests, just as the rainforest is, and what is ‘good’ for one man so often comes at the expense of another.”

Here Molyneux seems to be guilty of the ethical intrinsicism / subjectivism dichotomy, which I describe in detail in this video. It seems like he is trying to divorce someone’s interests and values from ethics, which of course begs the question “What good is ethics if it doesn’t do anything for my interests or values?”

Another problem here is that, even though Molyneux is trying to criticize the egoist position, he misrepresents it. A more valid formulation of the egoist position would be “that which is good for my survival and happiness.” It appears he was paraphrasing Rand, but any reader of Rand would understand that, in the context of that quotation, Rand was using the word “man” to refer to “an individual man”, not to mankind as Molyneux seems to interpret it here.

Molyneux then proceeds to attack this misrepresentation by forming an analogy. He states that the egoist position is “analogous to describing evolutionary tendencies as ‘that which is good for life’s survival.’” The obvious error here is likening an ethical theory to a scientific theory, a problem which will arise many times throughout UPB. The study of evolution has nothing to do with “good” or “bad” and this analogy comes across as a bit confusing as a result.

In ground rule #3, Molyneux rejects the theory that ethics exist in some higher plane of existence (such as Plato’s forms). I have no disagreement with him on this, so let’s move on to rule #4:

“I do not believe that morality can be defined or determined with reference to ‘arguments from effect,’ or the predicted consequences of ethical propositions. Utilitarianism, or ‘the greatest good for the greatest number,’ does not solve the problem of subjectivism, since the odds of any central planner knowing what is objectively good for everyone else are about the same as any central economic planner knowing how to efficiently allocate resources in the absence of price – effectively zero. Also, that which is considered ‘the greatest good for the greatest number’ changes according to culture, knowledge, time and circumstances, which also fails to overcome the problem of subjectivism. We do not judge the value of scientific experiments according to some Platonic higher realm, or some utilitarian optimisation – they are judged in accordance with the scientific method. I will take the same approach in this book.”

While Molyneux’s criticism of utilitarianism is solid, his criticism of “arguments from effect” is not. I’ll demonstrate with an example; which is better, a surgeon stabbing you in the chest at random, or a surgeon stabbing you in the chest to remove a malignant tumor?

Clearly the action of stabbing is being judged by any rational person by the consequences of that action. In the first example, only harm is incurred, resulting in a net loss for the person being stabbed. In the second example, the benefits of the surgery greatly exceed the harm incurred, resulting in a net gain for the person being stabbed.

Consequences are the only rational way to judge an action. Imagine if someone asserted that a given action was good even though it only caused harm and had no benefits at all. This would seem absurd and the action itself would seem pointless. Now how those consequences should be judged is another topic entirely; my point right now is simply that there is no other way to judge an action.

Notice how Molyneux has been using the word subjectivism. It appears that he has a concrete, intrinsic view of ethical principles in which the result of those principles must be the same for everyone. People are, of course, different, and the same action taken by two different people might have different ethical qualities based on the context, such as in the example of the two surgeons above.

The key thing to note is that even though the action is the same in both cases, the ethical principles behind those actions were different. In the same way, two people applying the same ethical principle can lead to them taking different actions. This is why Bob might become a baker and Joe might become a computer programmer despite sharing ethical principles.

If this is confusing, try to think of ethical principles as equations. If I have a mathematical function, my input is going to determine my output. If I insert the number 2, the function might output the number 7. If I insert the number 3, it might output the number 31. And so on.

Imagine if someone claimed that a given mathematical function was “subjective” (e.g. arbitrary) if it didn’t always output the same number. This is essentially what Molyneux is doing throughout the book when he refers to subjectivism.

I have no major disagreements with the rest of the ground rules that Molyneux presents, so I figure this is a good time to end Part I. Part II has been completed and is available now.

One interesting conclusion I have drawn from reading Agorist literature (namely Brad Spangler’s blog) is that socialists often correctly see injustice but incorrectly blame the market for the problem rather than the state, and libertarians (inconsistent ones anyway) often refuse to regard it as injustice in defense of the “free” market.

For example, look at this post about wage slavery. Notice how the effect of the state in the market has devalued wage labor, producing the phenomenon of wage slavery correctly recognized by leftists. Because of state intervention, we can no longer properly refer to employer/employee contracts as completely legitimate and non-coercive.

But state intervention and its effects are hardly limited to the area of wage labor. Regulations and subsidies favor some businesses over others. Taxes favor some people over others. Every area of state intervention (and there are thousands) necessarily skews the market in favor of some people at the expense of others.

That being said, can we really say that any economic interaction within our current state capitalist framework is voluntary? For example, am I making more or less money than I would on a free market? What if I get promoted? In which direction is my bargaining power skewed? Is it even possible to know?

I recently saw the title of Christopher Hitchen’s book God Is Not Great: How Religion Poisons Everything and I began to realize that one can simply substitute “God” and “Religion” with “the state.”

It is virtually impossible to know, within the context of a state market, whether a given interaction is fair or unfair. Sure there are some examples so violently skewed that injustice is obvious, but the more subtle it becomes, the harder it becomes to determine where and if injustice is occurring. The state poisons the market; the only true cure is to liberate it.

Nearly every religion has some entity that its adherents are expected to obey without question. Typically named something like God, Yahweh, or Allah, this entity is usually defined and described in ways to purposely put it outside the conception of the human mind so as to remove that pesky element of causality when those who proclaim the Holy One’s message are asked to logically defend their position.

For example, if we ask why God says one thing and does another, it’s because God works in mysterious ways, and he is so far beyond our understanding of the universe that we can’t possibly predict how or why he does what he does.

This of course allows whoever is speaking on behalf of “God” to make whatever proclamations they wish without having to provide valid reasoning. This is, of course, usually coupled with threats of eternal damnation if anyone disobeys or, until recently, the very real threat of being killed in some horrible way.

Statism is no different in this regard, and the deity that statists worship is typically the “greater good.” This concept (like God) is often given a variety of labels that all mean essentially the same thing; the common good, the will of the people, the nation, society, etc.

Just like God, the greater good is immeasurable. It is defined in ways that make it impossible to concretely determine what it is referring to. There is no equation in which you can plug variables and get output that equals the greater good.

And just like God, those who claim to act in favor of the greater good use the immeasurability of the concept as a smokescreen to avoid having to rationally defend their arguments. All is justified so long as one cites the greater good, without regard for what may appear to be blatant immorality.

This is just one of many important ways that Statism, at its core, qualifies as a religion just as much as Christianity, Buddhism, or any other contemporary religious sect.

Individualism is one of those words that gets thrown around like so much confetti and is so abused that it is easy to forget its true meaning and the origins of the concept it embodies. For example, let’s briefly examine the Webster’s definition of individualism:

1:a : (1) a doctrine that the interests of the individual are or ought to be ethically paramount; also : conduct guided by such a doctrine
(2) the conception that all values, rights, and duties originate in individuals

1:b : a theory maintaining the political and economic independence of the individual and stressing individual initiative, action, and interests; also : conduct or practice guided by such a theory

It is my opinion that the various definitions for individualism that Webster’s provides us manage to skirt around the edges of what the concept embodies without ever, in full detail, explaining the core concept that underlies all of them.

It is my opinion that the core concept of individualism is this; that human beings are individual, autonomous entities with separate minds, wills, values, and needs. I believe that it is from this fact that most other definitions of individualism can be derived.

One can use human anatomy as a brief but effective way to demonstrate the validity of this concept. Can you imagine any single human organ that would be capable of behaving or even surviving autonomously from the rest of the human form? Certainly we don’t look at a small portion of nerve tissue in a petri dish and conclude that it has feelings and aspirations and the ability to survive.

It is only when all of the human organs combine that they form an autonomous whole, an entity capable of providing for its own survival, having its own thoughts and values, and exercising its will.

Collectivists attempt to take this a step further. Man is a social animal, they say (and they are right), and needs others for his survival. From this they attempt to conclude that even a man himself is not an autonomous whole but instead consider him just another unit in a greater superorganism of “society”.

The problem with this argument is that it lies on false premises; clearly a single human being can operate independently of other human beings. While we can all benefit greatly from social interaction, it is not a base requirement of survival. Our needs and desires and values all exist separately from the human beings around us.

While a single neuron in a petri dish does not have values and cannot behave as an autonomous whole, a single man clearly can. This is where the collectivist argument falls apart.

So I reiterate my basic concept of individualism; that human beings are individual, autonomous entities with separate minds, wills, values, and needs.

Let’s examine each definition provided by Webster’s, one by one, using the concept of individualism I just defined to demonstrate how it leads to the various permutations provided by Webster’s.

1:a : (1) a doctrine that the interests of the individual are or ought to be ethically paramount

I would firstly point out that there is a false premise in this definition. By declaring that the “interests of the individual are or ought to be ethically paramount” it is assumed that interests outside of individuals exist and can be ranked, in an ethical hierarchy, above or below the interests of individuals.

As I discussed above, only single men are autonomous wholes, not a collective of men, so in the end all interests are the interests of either individuals or nobody. The interests of a given group of men are nothing more than the shared interests of multiple individuals.

Now if we interpret “the individual” to mean “me, as opposed to other individuals” the definition becomes more clear. In this sense, this definition is roughly the definition of ethical egoism.

Let’s look again at how I defined individualism; that human beings are individual, autonomous entities with separate minds, wills, values, and needs.

Once one recognizes that he is an individual human being with separate values from other human beings, it would follow that the values he should pursue are his own, derived from the application of reason to the sensory data he gathers from the world around him.

In fact, since an individual is autonomous and self-sufficient, reliance on others for one’s survival rather than pursuing one’s own values is an act of potential self-destruction. Once the men that such an individual is leeching off of withdraw their resources, such a man would quickly die.

Now let’s look at the second definition.

1:a : (2) the conception that all values, rights, and duties originate in individuals

While is is extremely close to the definition I provided for individuals, it fails to include that this results from the existence of individuals as autonomous, self-sufficient entities. A collectivist might interpret “individual” to mean “autonomous entity” and, having already concluded that the society superorganism is the only such entity, use this as an argument in favor of his position.

This is why it is vital to explain up front why individual human beings are individuals and no group also qualifies as such (Corporate personhood anyone?).

1:b : a theory maintaining the political and economic independence of the individual and stressing individual initiative, action, and interests

This is almost a definition of libertarianism, but a bit too vague to really be able to say that it is libertarianism. In fact, most modern politicians would probably claim to embrace this, although none of them believe it.

Once again, though, we see how the recognition of individual human beings as autonomous entities naturally leads to the conclusion drawn in the definition. After all, if there are no such things as collectives and there are only individual needs and interests, who could logically propose any system other than one that maintains “the political and economic independence of the individual and stressing individual initiative, action, and interests.”

I think the definition of individualism is important because it is the metaphysical base from which we draw ideas like ethical egoism, voluntaryism, and libertarianism. One must recognize the individual human being, especially oneself, as an autonomous, self-sufficient entity, and if one does so consistently, the rest will follow.